MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NIO/SP Meetings With SSC Staffers

1. I have had three sessions to date with Senate Select Committee staffers as follows:

First session, 1000-1100, 3 November, Mr. Ted Ralston.

Second session, 1030-1130, 8 November, Messrs. Ted Ralston and Bill Miller.

Third session, 1000-1115, 9 November, Mr. Ted Ralston.

- 2. First session. I explained in detail the evolution of the process for producing NIE 11-3/8 over the past twenty years. Questions raised by Mr. Ralston in the course of this explanation indicated a dominant interest in the mechanics and personnel involved in the process rather than the substance of the NIE. His questions concerned (a) the extent to which intelligence reached its judgments by extrapolating US developments and technology; (b) ONE's reaction to the charge that it was reluctant to accept evidence "staring it in the face;" (c) the method with which NIE 11-3/8 working groups are selected; (d) whether or not the DCI's Estimates Advisory Panel has been used yet in estimative process; (e) the status of the B Teams' efforts in the ongoing PFIAB experiment; and (f) the reasons why the PFIAB selected the people they did to perform the B Team analysis.
- 3. Second session. In contrast to the first session, this was more a free-wheeling exchange about substantive matters involving my responses to specific questions virtually all of which were posed by Mr. Miller. Questions dealt with (a) how intelligence would "handle" the "B-l question" (I answered that the role of intelligence in connection with the issue was the general evaluation of Soviet in defenses); (b) whether or not I subscribed to the view that intelligence shouldn't do net assessments (I said I did); (c) whether or not the DoD was the right place for net assessments to be done (I said I

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thought preferably the NSC); (d) when NIE 11-3/8-76 will be finished; (e) specific substantive issues to be dealt with in NIE 11-3/8-76 given the expectation that it is one of the few NIEs that the "new administration" will read; (f) my "guess" concerning the reason for the continuing Soviet pursuit of ABM R&D; and (g) whether or not Soviet-US nuclear exchange scenarios were realistic given that it wouldn't take much (one nuclear weapon or so) to knock out the vital command and control centers in Washington.

4. Third session. At Ralston's request, I described this year's activity in the NIO/SP program, listed and described the interagency memos prepared or in preparation, identified special subjects of attention in this year's 11-3/8, discussed the PFIAB-sponsored experiment briefly, and named key people involved in preparing this year's estimate. Ralston said he had lots more questions. I asked that he defer next session until after 21 November owing to my schedule. He agreed, said he had lots more homework to do. Track record of past estimates was mentioned. I noted that such a study had been done for PFIAB, said I didn't know whether it was privileged, suggested he ask Hepworth if he wanted it.

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